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BASEBALL’S DNA TESTING POLICY STRIKES OUT: 
GENETIC DISCRIMINATION IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 
Shannon K. Stevens∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The New York Yankees signed shortstop Damian Arredondo on 
July 3, 2009.
1
  The sixteen-year-old switch hitter from the Dominican 
Republic garnered an $850,000 signing bonus, and in return he 
promised a strong arm and speed—“he reportedly ran a 60-yard-dash 
in 6.4 seconds.”
2
  The problem is that Damian Arredondo is not six-
teen years old.  In fact, his name is not Damian Arredondo.
3
  Soon af-
ter the team signed him, a Major League Baseball (MLB) investiga-
tion revealed that he lied about his identity and his age.
4
  The 
Yankees subsequently voided his contract, and he is now a free agent.
5
 
Such stories are common.  Other MLB franchise teams have 
likewise been the victims of identity fraud by international players, 
particularly players from the Dominican Republic.
6
  Since the United 
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2011, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., 2008, 
Birmingham-Southern College.  I thank my Mom and Dad for their love and sup-
port.  I also thank Professor Bernstein for her thoughful commentary and Sarah 
Greers for her technical assistance.   
 1 Yankees Notes, N.J. RECORD, July 3, 2009, at S05, available at 2009 WLNR 
14510300.  
 2 Melissa Segura, Source: MLB Nixes Yanks’ Signing of Player with Fraudulent Identity, 
SI.COM (July 17, 2009), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2009/baseball/mlb/ 
07/16/yankees.signing/index.html. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Kevin Baxter, The Shortcuts, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2009, at C1, available at 2009 
WLNR 18644708.  
 5 Id.  
 6 See, e.g., Paul Hoynes, Tribe Paid $750,000 to Impostor, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, 
Sept. 19, 2009, at D5, available at http://www.cleveland.com/tribe/plaindealer/ 
index.ssf?/base/sports/1253349237110300.xml&coll=2 (covering the investigation of 
Cleveland Indians player Jose Ozoria who had claimed to be seventeen years old but 
who was actually twenty-year-old Wally Bryan); Mark Zuckerman, The Final Count-
down?, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2009, at C01, available at 2009 WLNR 3858470 (report-
ing that Washington Nationals’s sixteen-year-old Esmailyn Gonzales, who had re-
ceived a $1.4 million signing bonus, had falsified his identity; it was later discovered 
that the player was actually Carlos David Alvarez Lugo and four years older than 
claimed).   
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States began requiring stricter document verification after September 
11, 2001, 540 major and minor league baseball players were identi-
fied as lying about their identity or falsifying their age to make them-
selves appear younger.
7
  Most of these cases involve players from the 
Dominican Republic,
8
 but likely no one would suggest Dominican 
players are undeserving of the opportunity to play major league base-
ball.  The country is known for its proliferation of great baseball play-
ers.
9
  “[B]aseball is a natural resource for the Dominican Republic,”
10
 
and stars including Sammy Sosa, David Ortiz, and Manny Ramirez 
hail from the country.
11
  Regardless, teams are growing more guarded 
when recruiting international players.  For example, the Cleveland 
Indians recently contemplated requesting DNA tests for all incoming 
international players who sign for over a $50,000 bonus.
12
  The In-
dians’ Director of Scouting, John Mirabelli, noted that “it’s more ex-
pensive, but . . . we want to be as precise as we can be.”
13
 
In all probability, the age and identity problem will not soon dis-
appear.
14
  MLB teams pay high salaries to their top players.  In 2009, 
for example, the New York Yankees had a total payroll of over $200 
million and paid their players an average of $5 million each.
15
  MLB 
rookies can be awarded as much as $500,000 in starting salary with 
equally high signing bonuses.
16
  Dominican prospects, unlike U.S. 
and Canadian players, are not subject to a draft.
17
  Dominican sports 
agents, called “buscóns,” recruit and train young players and then 
 
 7 Baxter, supra note 4.  
 8 See id. 
 9 See Charles S. Farrel, Time for MLB to Play Hardball, BASEBALL REFLECTIONS (Aug. 
30, 2009) http://baseballreflections.com/2009/08/30/time-for-mlb-to-play-hardball. 
 10 Id.  
 11 See id.  
 12 Hoynes, supra note 6.  
 13 Id. 
 14 In a recent development, MLB insiders revealed that the organization is consi-
dering establishing a youth baseball league in the Dominican Republic.  Michael S. 
Schmidt, Baseball Considers Plan to Curtail Age Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2010, at B11, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/10/sports/baseball/10baseball.html. 
The plan could involve an MLB-run pipeline for Dominican talent and include a fin-
ger printing system to keep track of youth players.  Id.  
 15 See Major League Baseball Salary Database, USA TODAY, 
http://content.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/salaries/default.aspx (last visited Aug. 
23, 2010).  
 16 Michael S. Schmidt & Alan Schwarz, Baseball’s Use of DNA Raises Questions, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 22, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/22/ 
sports/baseball/22dna.html. 
 17 Baxter, supra note 4. 
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negotiate contracts and signing bonuses on the players’ behalf.
18
  The 
buscón can receive up to half of the bonus as compensation.
19
  Be-
cause money and fame accompany young, talented players, age and 
identity fraud are unfortunately common, especially as Dominican 
players have the additional pressure of a greedy buscón. 
In a written statement, MLB announced that it would be request-
ing DNA samples from Dominican prospects on a consensual basis to 
address the age and identity fraud problem.
20
  Some franchise teams 
have gone one step further in requiring DNA tests for all internation-
al recruits.
21
  In the past, Dominican players have found others willing 
to lend a younger child’s birth certificate for the player to submit as 
proof of age.
22
  Similar to the widely publicized controversies involv-
ing players in the Little League World Series—and in contrast to 
Women’s Olympic Gymnastics—it is far more beneficial for a pros-
pective player to appear younger than older.
23
  Using DNA samples, 
MLB’s Office of Investigations can determine whether the parents 
listed on the birth certificate are in fact the biological parents of the 
player and consequently, whether the office should further question 
the age of the prospect.
24
  Thus, the investigation is essentially into 
the paternity and maternity of the individuals listed on the birth cer-
tificate. 
Alarmingly, scouts and commentators have speculated that MLB 
is keeping and testing DNA samples to determine a player’s suscepti-
bility to disease and injury.
25
  MLB has declined to say whether it 
keeps the samples.
26
  The scouting director for one team stated that 
he was not sure whether the MLB could test for susceptibility to can-
cer, but “[he knew] they’re looking into trying to figure out suscepti-
 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Alan Schwarz, A Future in Baseball, Hinging on DNA, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2009, at 
B11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/sports/baseball/23dna.html.  
 21 See supra text accompanying notes 12–13.  
 22 Schmidt & Schwarz, supra note 16. 
 23 See Bill Pennington, Baseball; No Sliding in Little League: No Papers, No Tourna-
ment, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2003, at D5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/ 
06/25/sports/baseball-no-sliding-in-little-league-no-papers-no-tournament.html? 
pagewanted=all; Juliet Macur, Teeny-Tiny Matter of Age for China’s Gymnasts, N.Y. TIMES, 
August 9, 2008, at SP6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/ 
08/10/sports/olympics/10age.html. 
 24 See Schmidt & Schwarz, supra note 16. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Jesse Sanchez, MLB, Clubs Using DNA Tests on Prospects, MLB.COM (July 22, 
2009, 3:05 AM),http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20090722&content_id= 
5993474&vkey=news_mlb&fext=.jsp.  
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bility to injuries.”
27
  Such a practice, while unverified, conjures up un-
settling images reminiscent of Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World or the 
1997 movie GATTACA.
28
 
Genetic information contains a wealth of data about a person.  
Humans, indeed all living things, contain cells—the basic units of 
life.
29
  Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), the source of genetic informa-
tion, is found in each cell.
30
  Long strands of DNA intertwine with the 
help of proteins to form chromosomes.
31
  DNA represents the instruc-
tions for operating the cell and has two primary functions.
32
  The first 
is to code for making proteins.
33
  Cell machinery “reads” DNA and 
manufactures amino acids, which are subsequently strung together to 
form the proteins making up the tissues and organs of the body.
34
  
The second function of DNA is to copy the instructions for reproduc-
tion and delivery to offspring.
35
  To accomplish this vital task, cell ma-
chinery again “reads” the DNA, makes a copy of it, and stores it in 
sperm or egg cells.
36
 
Mistakes in the DNA, called “mutations,” can cause disease.  
Where the DNA contains a mutation, cell machinery may make the 
wrong protein, make too much of it, or fail to make it altogether.
37
  
Such problems with protein synthesis can cause disease or increase 
one’s chances of developing disease.
38
  For example, amyotrophic lat-
eral sclerosis (ALS or “Lou Gehrig Disease”)
39
 is a motor neuron dis-
order that causes random weakness, muscle atrophy, and cramps.
40
  
Death, which in a majority of cases occurs within three years, often 
 
 27 Schmidt & Schwarz, supra note 16. 
 28 See ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (Harper Perennial Modern Classics 
2006) (1932); GATTACA (Columbia Pictures 1997). 
 29 James Evans et al., Genetics, in SCIENCE FOR LAWYERS 175, 178 (Erik York Drogin 
ed., 2008). 
 30 Id. 
 31 STUART M. BROWN  ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF MEDICAL GENOMICS 18 (2003). 
 32 Evans et al., supra note 29, at 180. 
 33 Id. at 182. 
 34 BROWN ET AL., supra note 31, at 18. 
 35 Evans et al., supra note 29, at 185–86. 
 36 Id. at 186. 
 37 Id. at 188. 
 38 Id. 
 39 This disease was made famous when baseball great Lou Gehrig was diagnosed 
with ALS.  ATLAS OF PATHOPHYSIOLOGY 116 (H. Nancy Holmes ed., 2002).  One can-
not help but ask this question: would the Yankees have continued to start Gehrig if 
they knew he was predisposed to ALS? 
 40 MERCK MANUAL 1897–98 (Mark H. Beers et al. eds., 18th ed. 2006). 
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results from the failure of respiratory muscles.
41
  ALS has multiple 
contributing causes, one of which is a mutation in DNA.
42
 
Genetic testing can reveal these mutations, and herein lies the 
danger; MLB teams use the DNA test to determine paternity.
43
  A ge-
netic test is a broad term, but it could include a test that analyzes 
DNA, RNA, genes, or chromosomes.
44
  With this information, the tes-
ter can determine what diseases the subject has or might one day de-
velop.
45
  Importantly, DNA does not encode for age.
46
  As we age, our 
chromosomes become more susceptible to damage,
47
 but no genetic 
test can tell an investigator that the owner of a particular sample of 
DNA is twenty years old.
48
  Accordingly, any genetic testing MLB re-
quires—ostensibly to determine a player’s age—will necessarily reveal 
genetic information other than age and will be incapable of deter-
mining the player’s age directly. 
After receiving media attention, the MLB DNA testing policy has 
come under fire, and commentators are raising questions concerning 
its ethical implications and legality.
49
  This Comment addresses the 
wide range of ethical and legal issues arising from the policy.  It con-
cludes that the MLB policy skirts the bioethical line unnecessarily.  
Not only does MLB face strong potential for a legal battle, it faces, 
and already has faced, judgment in the public sphere.
50
  Most impor-
tantly, good old-fashioned detective work and less invasive medical 
procedures, such as a bone scan, are a much less controversial way to 
discover and prevent age and identity fraud.
51
 
Part II of this Comment will summarize genetic discrimination 
and how, in the context of sports, it raises an interesting problem be-
 
 41 Id. 
 42 ATLAS OF PATHOPHYSIOLOGY, supra note 39, at 116. 
 43 Schmidt & Schwarz, supra note 16. 
 44 See, e.g., MICHELE SCHOONMAKER & ERIN D. WILLIAMS, GENETIC TESTING: 
SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND AND NONDISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION 9 (2006).  
 45 Id. at 10.  
 46 There is no particular gene or set of genes for age as there might be for brown 
hair and blue eyes.  While a genome will likely sustain greater damage as the individ-
ual ages, there is no genetic test for age.  See generally ROBERT ARKING, THE BIOLOGY OF 
AGING: OBSERVATIONS AND PRINCIPLES (3rd ed. 2006). 
 47 Id. at 368.  
 48 See supra note 46. 
 49 See supra text accompanying notes 23–26. 
 50 For discussion relating to the potential legal battle see infra Part IV.  For dis-
cussion relating to public scrutiny see supra notes 25–28. 
 51 See infra Part IV for a discussion of alternatives to a DNA test that do not raise 
liability issues.    
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cause professional sports teams depend directly on the health of 
players for success.  Part III will discuss the applicability of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and why this Act does not provide an 
adequate remedy in this specific context.  Part IV is a comprehensive 
overview of Title II of the recently enacted Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) and its possible application to the 
MLB DNA testing policy.  Finally, Part V provides an overview of state 
laws addressing genetic discrimination and specifically reviews the 
New York genetic discrimination statute. 
II. GENETIC DISCRIMINATION AND THE CURIOUS PROBLEM OF 
PROFESSIONAL ATHLETICS 
Genetic discrimination is not a new phenomenon.  Early exam-
ples involved discrimination based on phenotype (the physical ma-
nifestation of a genetic trait)
52
 and sought to purify or discriminate 
among the population’s ethnic or racial makeup.  The federal gov-
ernment established the Eugenics Records Office in 1910; its mission 
was to collect genetic data to ensure that marriages would be suitable 
based on various genetic criteria.
53
  Passed in the form of immigration 
restrictions, a 1924 federal act limited the entry of Southern and 
Eastern European immigrants.
54
  President Calvin Coolidge, who pre-
viously said “America must be kept American,” quickly signed the Act 
into law.
55
 
States also had a hand in the genetic discrimination pervasive in 
the early 1900s.  Many states passed sterilization laws targeting racial 
minorities, immigrants, and institutionalized individuals.  Pennsylva-
nia’s law, entitled the “Act for the Prevention of Idiocy,” authorized 
the sterilization of “feebleminded” children for whom procreation 
was inadvisable as determined by state institution surgeons.
56
  The 
“Indiana Plan” intended to address crime and degenerate classes of 
humanity by requiring vasectomies—a simple outpatient procedure.
57
  
In 1927, the Supreme Court upheld Virginia’s forced sterilization 
 
 52 Early genetic discrimination, if merely based on phenotype, would not involve 
modern genetic testing such as a DNA test.  For one of the first instances of modern 
genetic profiling see Alec J. Jeffreys et al., Hypervariable ‘Minisatellite’ Regions in Human 
DNA, 314 NATURE 67 (1984).  
 53 Id. at 100.  
 54 DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE USE OF HUMAN 
HEREDITY 97 (1985). 
 55 Id.  
 56 EDWIN BLACK, WAR AGAINST THE WEAK: EUGENICS AND AMERICA’S CAMPAIGN TO 
CREATE A MASTER RACE 66 (2003).  
 57 ELOF AXEL CARLSON, THE UNFIT: A HISTORY OF A BAD IDEA 247 (2001).  
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laws, declining to strike down the program on either Fourteenth 
Amendment due process or equal protection grounds.
58
 
Decades later, sickle-cell-anemia screening programs began.
59
  
These programs, which by default targeted African Americans,
60
 iden-
tified carriers of the disease.
61
  Scientists suggested at the time that 
healthy carriers might be particularly susceptible to toxins such as 
benzene, lead, cadmium, carbon monoxide, and cyanide.
62
  Not sur-
prisingly, employers began testing for the sickle-cell-anemia gene 
based on this theory to single out those employees that might be sus-
ceptible to workplace toxins.
63
  Because the practice led to widespread 
stigmatization and discrimination against carriers, Congress ultimate-
ly passed the National Sickle Cell Anemia Control Act in 1972, which 
withholds federal funds from states unless sickle-cell-anemia testing is 
voluntary.
64
 
It is no wonder then that fears developed over the acquisition 
and use of genetic information, especially in the context of employ-
ment.  The breadth of information provided leaves an individual feel-
ing particularly vulnerable and apprehensive about its use.
65
  A 1997 
national telephone survey found that when asked whether the res-
pondent would take a genetic test if insurers or employers had access 
to the results, sixty-three percent said no.
66
  In 2004, a John Hopkins 
University study similarly found that less than ten percent of those 
surveyed believed that employers should have access to genetic in-
formation.
67
  A report by the Department of Labor, the Department 
of Health and Human Services, and the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission cited a study of just under one thousand people 
that identified two hundred cases of genetic discrimination, as well as 
 
 58 Buck v. Bell, 247 U.S. 200 (1927).  
 59 Melinda B. Kaufmann, Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace: An Overview of Ex-
isting Protections, 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 393, 402 (1999). 
 60 JUDY MONROE PETERSON, SICKLE CELL ANEMIA 6 (2009). 
 61 Kaufmann, supra note 59, at 402.   
 62 Katherine Brokaw, Comment, Genetic Screening in the Workplace and Employers’ 
Liability, 23 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 317, 323 (1990). 
 63 Kaufmann, supra note 59, at 402–03.  
 64 Id. 
 65 See Erin D. Williams et al., Genetic Discrimination: Overview of the Issue and Pro-
posed Legislation, in GENETIC DISCRIMINATION 13 (Leana J. Albertson ed., 2008) (ex-
plaining the impact of the fear of discrimination on behavior). 
 66 NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INST., GENETIC INFORMATION AND THE 
WORKPLACE 1 (1998), available at http://www.genome.gov/10001732. 
 67 GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., JOHN HOPKINS UNIV., REPRODUCTIVE GENETIC 
TESTING: WHAT AMERICANS THINK 43 (2004), available at http://www.dnapolicy.org/ 
pub.reports.php?action=detail&report_id=6. 
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a study that identified five hundred people who were denied insur-
ance or employment on the basis of a genetic predisposition to dis-
ease.
68
  The fears underlying these statistics stem from the idea that 
an individual’s genetic data can be arbitrarily and maliciously used to 
discriminate against a person when seeking insurance or employ-
ment.  The findings illustrate that receipt of another’s genetic profile 
opens up a Pandora’s Box of information especially susceptible to 
abuse.
69
 
But genetic discrimination in the context of professional sports 
raises a more complex issue.  While many jobs require general well-
being, there is not a strong emphasis on a single employee’s perfor-
mance, and success is not closely tied to physical ability.
70
  For exam-
ple, although an employee may have asthma or sickle-cell-anemia, her 
condition would not normally prevent her from being a successful 
lawyer, doctor, or teacher. 
This is not the case, however, in the context of professional 
sports.  A professional baseball player’s success, much less his career, 
depends on his physical well-being.  In a sense, health is a legitimate 
and necessary job qualification, and employers must consider it to 
protect themselves and the employee from harm.  Paul Trumble ar-
gues that “the influence of athlete-employees differs from the influ-
ence of ordinary employees in two key interrelated respects—
heightened organizational and financial dependence of the sports 
employer on the athlete-employee.”
71
  Furthermore, these teams rely 
on a small number of athletes and depend almost exclusively on the 
employees’ health for financial success.
72
  Thus, the arbitrariness and 
insidiousness that often characterizes employment discrimination is 
not necessarily present in the professional sports context. 
Even though health may seem like a legitimate job qualification 
for a professional athlete, genetic testing is still extremely problemat-
 
 68 H.R. Rep. No. 110-28, pt. 3 at 27 (2007).  
 69 But see Colin S. Diver & Jane Maslow Cohen, Genophobia: What Is Wrong with Ge-
netic Discrimination, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1463 (2001) (suggesting that the evi-
dence provided by such studies is too anecdotal to adequately describe the extent 
and nature of genetic discrimination). 
 70 For a discussion of the number of employees in an organization affecting the 
success of the organization see Paul D. Trumble, “Knickel” and Dime Issues: An Unex-
plored Loophole in New York’s Genetic Discrimination Statute and the Viability of Genetic Test-
ing in the Sports Employment Context, 70 ALB. L. REV. 771, 789 (2007). 
 71 Id. at 788. 
 72 Id. at 789; see also Rich Coutinho, The 2009 Mets: A Year of Misery, Injury, and In-
stability, NEW YORK SPORTS (Dec. 29, 2009, 12:10 PM), 
http://thestarryeye.typepad.com/nysports/2009/12/the-2009-mets-a-year-of-misery-
injury-and-instability.html.  
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ic because of the possibility that genetic information will be used in 
irrelevant or inappropriate ways.  Take as an example the circums-
tances surrounding former Chicago Bulls center Eddy Curry.  Curry 
began experiencing heart discomfort during March of 2005 and un-
derwent testing by cardiologists who confirmed the structural sound-
ness of his heart.
73
  He was, however, diagnosed with athletic tachy-
cardia, or “athlete’s heart,” which is a condition that develops when 
significant amounts of physical exertion over time enlarge the heart.
74
  
Despite the fact that the first set of cardiologists cleared him to play, 
the Bulls sought the opinion of another cardiologist who suggested 
Curry might be susceptible to developing hypertrophic cardiomyopa-
thy—a rare but potentially deadly condition.
75
  When the Bulls in-
sisted that Curry take a DNA test, Curry refused; although he did se-
cure a six-year, $56 million contract with the Bulls, he was traded to 
the New York Knicks.
76
  It is doubtful anyone would argue that Curry’s 
career as a professional basketball player would not be in jeopardy if 
he were found to have severe heart problems.
77
  Ultimately, although 
Curry was able to sign a long-term contract, it is disturbing that the 
Bulls pressed the issue after Curry successfully passed a battery of 
tests.  In short, the DNA test was invasive because it was unnecessary. 
Despite the curveball that professional athletics throws into the 
genetic discrimination discussion, it is still a contentious issue, and its 
victims deserve legal protection.  Merit-based decisions in employ-
ment have long been a goal of federal legislation.
78
  The discussion 
that follows will address efforts to provide legal redress for the dis-
criminatory use of genetic information in the employment context, 
which many fear the new MLB policy will encourage. 
 
 73 Michael A. McCann, Professional Sports and Collective Bargaining: The Reckless Pur-
suit of Dominion: A Situational Analysis of the NBA Diminishing Player Autonomy, 8 U. PA. 
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 819, 819–20 (2006). 
 74 Id. at 847. 
 75 Mark Starr, Sports: To Play or Not to Play, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 31, 2005, at 13, availa-
ble at http://www.newsweek.com/id/50690.  
 76 Marc J. Spears, Curry Plays on Despite Questions, DENVER POST, Nov. 18, 2005, at 
D01, available at 2005 WLNR 18672354. 
 77 See also Ian Thomsen, Change of Heart, Pro Leagues Should Make a Common Car-
diac Test Mandatory, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 31, 2005, at 26, available at 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1106568/index.htm 
(discussing whether NBA teams should require testing to discover potential heart 
abnormalities in the wake of the death of Atlanta Hawks player Jason Collier).  
 78 One example is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits em-
ployment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.  
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).  Another example is the Americans with Disabilities 
Act discussed in Part III of this comment.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).   
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III. INADEQUACY OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT TO 
REMEDY GENETIC DISCRIMINATION 
The Americans with Disabilities Act was enacted to eliminate 
discrimination against individuals based on disability.
79
  Title I of the 
ADA specifically prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in 
employment.
80
  The claim of genetic discrimination in the workplace, 
however, has not proved a good fit for litigation under the ADA.  
Specifically, a genetic predisposition to disease may not fall within the 
Act’s definition of a disability.  Also, genetic testing by an employer 
may escape scrutiny under the Act’s restrictions on pre-hiring medi-
cal examinations and disability-related inquiry.  These barriers pre-
vent the ADA from providing adequate protections to victims of ge-
netic discrimination in employment. 
As a threshold matter, in order to qualify for protection under 
the ADA, the claimant must have a disability.
81
  The statute defines 
disability in three ways.  First, the ADA defines it as a “physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life ac-
tivities.”
82
  Although the actual manifestation of a genetic disease 
would be considered a disability if substantially limiting a major life 
activity,
83
 the predisposition to that genetic disease does not fit within 
the literal definition because it does not amount to a manifested im-
pairment.
84
 
The second definition of disability is “a record of such an im-
pairment.”
85
  This category covers individuals who have a history or 
record of impairment or who have been misclassified as having an 
impairment.
86
  But here again, a claimant’s mere disposition provides 
no history, record, or misclassification. 
 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. §§ 12112–12117. 
 81 § 12112(a). 
 82 Id. § 12102(1)(A). 
 83 See, e.g., Dennin v. Conn. Interscholastic Athletic Conference, Inc., 94 F.3d 96, 
98 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that Down Syndrome, a genetic disease, is a disability un-
der the ADA). 
 84 J.H. GERARDS ET AL., GENETIC DISCRIMINATION AND GENETIC PRIVACY IN A 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 154 (2005); Mark S. Dichter & Sarah E. Sutor, The New Ge-
netic Age: Do Our Genes Make Us Disabled Individuals Under the Americans With Disabilities 
Act?, 42 VILL. L. REV. 613, 620 (1997); Charles B. Gurd, Whether a Genetic Defect Is a 
Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: Preventing Genetic Discrimination by 
Employers, 1 ANNALS HEALTH L. 107, 112 (1992).  
 85 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(B). 
 86 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (2010). 
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Finally, the ADA protects as disabled those individuals who are 
“regarded” as having an impairment.
87
  This definition provides the 
most promising avenue for individuals who have a predisposition to 
genetic disease.  The Code of Federal Regulations subdivides this de-
finition into three further categories.  The first category includes in-
dividuals with impairments that do not substantially limit major life 
activities but are treated by the employer as having such limitations.
88
  
In the second category, the individual has an impairment that sub-
stantially limits activities only as a result of the attitudes of others to-
wards such impairment.
89
  In the third, the individual has none of the 
impairments but is treated by a covered entity as having a substantial-
ly limiting impairment.
90
 
With respect to the third category, only the employer’s percep-
tion and treatment are at issue, and thus, an individual with a predis-
position to a genetic condition could have a qualifying disability that 
is afforded the protections of the ADA.
91
  The interpretive guidance 
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sup-
ports this notion.  It states that the third definition of disability “ap-
plies to individuals who are subjected to discrimination on the basis 
of genetic information.”
92
  Additionally, in 2000 President Clinton is-
sued an executive order prohibiting genetic discrimination in federal 
employment consistent with the EEOC guidance.
93
  But this order 
does not address private or state employment and is made under the 
executive’s vague authority to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed” granted by Article I of the Constitution.
94
  Furthermore, 
the seemingly favorable EEOC guidelines may have persuasive au-
thority but are not binding.
95
  Importantly, courts have not, and likely 
will not, consider predisposition to a disease a disability under the 
 
 87 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C). 
 88 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1).  
 89 Id. § 1630.2(l)(2). 
 90 Id. § 1630.2(l)(3). 
 91 GERARDS ET AL., supra note 84, at 156; Dichter & Sutor, supra note 84, at 620. 
 92 3 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 902.8 
(1995). 
 93 Exec. Order No. 13,145, 65 Fed. Reg. 6877 (Feb. 8, 2000). 
 94 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1. 
 95 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“We consider that the 
rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not 
controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of ex-
perience and informed judgment.”).   
STEVENS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2011  9:49 AM 
824 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:813 
ADA.
96
  The Supreme Court has also narrowly interpreted “disabili-
ty.”
97
  And although Congress ultimately rejected the Court’s narrow 
construction by amending the ADA, it did not include any provision 
in the amendments that defined genetic predisposition as a disabili-
ty
98
—likely because of the impending consideration of the Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act.  Thus, it is unlikely that a clai-
mant with a mere genetic predisposition could demonstrate a disabil-
ity under the ADA. 
Genetic testing may also escape scrutiny under the ADA’s restric-
tions on pre-hiring medical examinations and disability-related inqui-
ries.  These provisions state that “a covered entity shall not conduct a 
medical examination or make inquiries of a job applicant as to 
whether such applicant is an individual with a disability or as to the 
nature or severity of a disability.”
99
  It is acceptable, however, to “make 
preemployment inquiries into the ability of an applicant to perform 
job-related functions.”
100
  Additionally, and most significantly, once an 
offer of employment is made, the entity can require a medical ex-
amination and may condition the offer on the result of this examina-
tion under three conditions:
101
 (1) all incoming employees must be 
subjected to the examination; (2) the information obtained must be 
collected and maintained on separate and confidential forms; and 
(3) the results of the medical examination must be used in accor-
dance with the ADA.
102
 
 
 96 William J. McDevitt, I Dream of GINA: Understanding the Employment Provisions of 
the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 54 VILL. L. REV. 91, 104–05 
(2009); see Mark A. Rothstein, GINA, the ADA, and Genetic Discrimination in Employment, 
36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 837, 837–38 (2008). 
 97 See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197–99 (2002) 
(finding the respondent who claimed that her employer failed to reasonably accom-
modate her carpal tunnel syndrome did not have a disability under the ADA by rea-
soning that Congress intended that the element of disability be a high bar), super-
seded by ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, sec. (2)(b)(4), (5), 122 
Stat. 3553, 3554; Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 507 (1999) (finding 
that the petitioner who was diagnosed with myopia did not have a disability under 
the ADA and adopting an “understanding that those whose impairments are largely 
corrected by medication or other devices are not ‘disabled’ within the meaning of 
the ADA”), superseded by ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, sec. 
(2)(b)(3), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554.  
 98 See sec. 5, § 102, 122 Stat. at 3557 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12112 
(Supp. II 2008). 
 99 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A) (2006). 
 100 Id. § 12112(d)(2)(B). 
 101 Id. § 12112(d)(3). 
 102 §§ 12112(d)(3)(A)–(C). 
STEVENS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2011  9:49 AM 
2011] COMMENT 825 
Administrative regulations complement the language of the 
medical examinations provision.  The Code of Federal Regulations 
provides that an entity “may make pre-employment inquiries into the 
ability of an applicant to perform job-related functions, and/or may 
ask an applicant to describe or to demonstrate how, with or without 
reasonable accommodation, the applicant will be able to perform job-
related functions.”
103
  The EEOC Compliance Manual defines a pro-
hibited “disability-related inquiry” as one “that is likely to elicit infor-
mation about a disability.”
104
  Relevant examples provided by the 
EEOC of prohibited conduct include asking an employee to provide 
medical documentation regarding a disability; asking an employee’s 
co-worker, family member, or other person about the employee’s dis-
ability; and, significantly, asking about an employee’s genetic infor-
mation.
105
  Further, the EEOC makes clear that this provision is not 
limited in application to qualified individuals with a disability, but ra-
ther that “the ADA’s restrictions on inquiries and examinations apply 
to all employees, not just those with disabilities.”
106
 
Nonetheless, this provision of the ADA may also fail to provide 
adequate protections.  The statutory language allows employers to ex-
tend a bona fide conditional job offer and then to subsequently deny 
employment to individuals whose disabilities are discovered during a 
post-offer exam.
107
  The Ninth Circuit dismissed just such a medical 
examination-based claim—where an employer retracted an offer after 
a medical exam—in Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkley Laboratory.
108
  
The plaintiffs voluntarily agreed to submit blood and urine samples 
after the employer made offers conditional upon a medical examina-
tion; however, the plaintiffs were unaware that the employer was test-
ing for sickle cell anemia, syphilis, and pregnancy.
109
  The court held 
that “the ADA imposes no restriction on the scope of entrance exami-
nations; it only guarantees the confidentiality of the information ga-
thered and restricts the use to which an employer may put the infor-
mation.”
110
 
 
 103 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(a) (2010). 
 104 2 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 
915.002 (2000). 
 105 Id.  
 106 Id. (emphasis added).  
 107 Jan W. Sturner, Preemployment Medical Exams Under the ADA, 50 ARK. L. REV. 449, 
452 (1997).  
 108 135 F.3d 1260, 1264 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 109 Id. at 1265.  
 110 Id. at 1273. 
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Although the case eventually settled, EEOC v. Burlington Northern 
Santa Fe Railroad provides an example of a genetic discrimination 
claim that may have been viable under the ADA.
111
  In 2001, the 
EEOC sought a preliminary injunction to require the Burlington 
Northern Santa Fe Railroad to end genetic testing of employees filing 
work-related injury claims.
112
  The workers claimed that they were re-
quired to submit blood samples, but they were not told of or asked to 
consent to genetic testing for a chromosome deletion that leads to 
some types of carpal tunnel syndrome.
113
  Apparently, the company 
believed (erroneously) that this test could demonstrate that the car-
pal tunnel syndrome was genetic rather than work-related.
114
  One 
employee, George Avary, claimed that the company had threatened 
disciplinary action after he refused to provide a blood sample.
115
  The 
EEOC took the position that the genetic testing violated the ADA, 
specifically the restrictions under § 12112(d) on medical examina-
tions and inquiries, because the examination was not “job related and 
consistent with business necessity.”
116
  In April of 2001, however, the 
EEOC settled with the railroad.
117
  The agreement called for the rail-
road to cease directly or indirectly requiring its employees to submit 
samples for genetic testing; to refrain from analyzing any blood sam-
ples that it already possessed; to refrain from evaluating, analyzing, or 
considering any genetic analysis previously performed on an em-
ployee; and to refrain from retaliating or threatening adverse action 
against employees opposed to genetic testing or those who took part 
 
 111 EEOC v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R., No. 01-4013 (N.D. Iowa filed Feb. 9, 
2001).  
 112 Press Release, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Petitions Court to 
Ban Genetic Testing of Railroad Workers in First EEOC Case Challenging Genetic 
Testing Under Americans with Disabilities Act (Feb. 9, 2001), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/press/2-9-01-c.html.  
 113 Id.  
 114 Dr. Phillip Chance, the creator of this particular genetic test, was disturbed by 
reports that the company had employed it in this manner because it was designed to 
uncover a disease that rarely causes carpal tunnel syndrome.  See Patricia A. Roche, 
The Genetic Revolution at Work: Legislative Efforts to Protect Employees, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 
271, 276 n.36 (2002). 
 115 Tamar Lewin, Commission Sues Railroad to End Genetic Testing in Work Injury Cas-
es, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2001, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2001/02/10/us/commission-sues-railroad-to-end-genetic-testing-in-work-injury-
cases.html?pagewanted=1.  
 116 Press Release, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, supra note 112. 
 117 Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R., No. 01-4013 (N.D. Iowa April 18, 2001) (order 
granting preliminary settlement agreement). 
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in the EEOC proceedings.
118
  This case could have potentially opened 
the door to inclusion of genetic discrimination under the ADA.  Un-
fortunately, no factfinder considered the case, and the ADA has yet to 
emerge as a key protection against genetic discrimination. 
A pre-employment medical examination, however, would likely 
yield only information relevant to the possibility of disease, not evi-
dence of a manifested disability, and thus would not violate the 
ADA.
119
  An employer could use medical information obtained to 
screen out genetically predisposed job applicants as long as the dis-
ease or condition could not reasonably be accommodated and “the 
exclusionary criterion is job-related and consistent with business ne-
cessity.”
120
  While this policy contravenes the requirement that all en-
tering employees be subject to an examination if the employer wishes 
to condition an offer of employment on the results of a medical ex-
amination,
121
 the results are nonetheless being used in accordance 
with the provisions of the ADA.  That is, a court will probably not 
consider the examination to be inquiring into a disability, and the 
court will thus convert what would otherwise be a clear violation un-
der the ADA into an acceptable activity because the Act would no 
longer apply.  Unlike in Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad, MLB is 
not testing for evidence of a genetic disorder that has already mani-
fested symptoms.  Therefore, the DNA testing policy is unlikely to fall 
within the ADA restrictions on employer medical examinations. 
IV. BASEBALL’S DNA TESTING POLICY VIOLATES THE GENETIC 
INFORMATION NONDISCRIMINATION ACT 
A. Background and Legislative History 
In an effort to cure the apparent inadequacies of the ADA in the 
context of genetic discrimination, Congress passed the Genetic In-
formation Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) in 2008.
122
  Broadly, GINA 
provides protections against the discriminatory use of genetic infor-
 
 118 Press Release, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Settles ADA Suit 
Against BNSF For Genetic Bias (Apr. 18, 2001), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/ 
press/4-18-01.html. 
 119 See supra text accompanying notes 103–105. Again, even if a preemployment 
examination caused an employer to treat the employee as having a genetic predispo-
sition, the protections of the ADA would not be triggered.  See supra text accompany-
ing notes 90–98. 
 120 GERARDS ET AL., supra note 84, at 165.  
 121 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(A) (2006). 
 122 Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff–
2000ff-11 (Supp. II 2008). 
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mation by both health insurers and employers.
123
  Congress recog-
nized that advances in the sequencing of the human genome have 
provided major opportunities for medical progress, genetic testing, 
and individual awareness of susceptibility to disease and treatments.
124
  
Such advances, however, give rise to “the potential misuse of genetic 
information to discriminate in health insurance and employment.”
125
  
To support the legislation, Congress provided examples of this mi-
suse citing sterilization laws, sickle cell anemia screening programs, 
and pre-employment genetic screenings such as the ones at issue in 
Norman-Bloodsaw and Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad.
126
 
Additionally, both the House and Senate reports demonstrated a 
concern with preserving privacy of genetic information and the asso-
ciated fear of its misuse.  For example, the House report noted, 
“[t]he value of genetic information . . . is personal to individuals, who 
may choose to utilize this information to help guide . . . life deci-
sions.”
127
  Moreover, the lack of complete information about the un-
derlying genetic and environmental components of diseases and their 
relevance to patient care make regulation of the area difficult for pol-
icy makers.
128
  But regardless of the incomplete scientific understand-
ing of genetic science, the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, 
and Pensions concluded that fears of discriminatory treatment are 
not hypothetical.
129
  The Committee listed surveys and statistics de-
monstrating that employers currently or have in the past used genetic 
information to make hiring and firing decisions.
130
  With these prob-
lems in mind, the Senate report states that the protections provided 
by Title II of GINA (addressing the area of employment) are meant 
to mimic those of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
131
 
The testimony of the sponsors of the bill and others in Congress 
demonstrates this intention.  For example, Representative Slaughter 
of New York, who introduced the bill, described it as the “first civil 
 
 123 See id. § 2.  
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. at § 2(1). 
 126 Id. §§ 2(2)–(4); see also supra Parts II–III. 
 127 H.R. Rep. No. 110-28, pt. 3, at 26 (2007). 
 128 Id. 
 129 S. Rep. No. 110-48, at 1 (2007). 
 130 Id.; see also supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text.  Further, employees do 
not have recourse under the ADA.  See supra Part III.   
 131 S. Rep. No. 110-48, at 27 (2007). 
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rights legislation of the 21st century.”
132
  She too provided anecdotal 
evidence of genetic discrimination and associated fears: a North Car-
olina woman was fired after a genetic test revealed a lung disorder 
even though the disorder was being successfully treated; an adoption 
agency refused to allow a woman at risk of developing Huntington’s 
disease to adopt a child; and numerous university studies that have 
identified fear of the use of genetic information by employers.
133
 
B. Statutory Language and Proposed Rules 
Title II of GINA states in relevant part that it is unlawful for an 
employer to “fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge, any employee, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any employee” on the basis of ge-
netic information.
134
  Also, an employer is prohibited from request-
ing, requiring, or purchasing the genetic information of an employee 
or family member of the employee, except for a few delineated statu-
tory exceptions.
135
  “Employee” has the same definition as provided in 
the Civil Rights Act and thus includes any applicant for employ-
ment.
136
  A genetic test is one that analyzes human DNA, chromo-
somes, or mutations.
137
  The term “genetic information” includes ge-
netic tests of the individual, genetic tests of a family member, and the 
manifestation of a disease or disorder of the individual or a family 
member.
138
  But relevant to the current discussion, the term “genetic 
information” explicitly excludes information about the age of an in-
dividual.
139
 
In November of 2010, the EEOC issued final rules for publica-
tion in the Code of Federal Regulations.
140
  In discussing the regula-
tions corresponding to Title II of the Act, the EEOC offered interpre-
tation of the purpose, definitions, and prohibitions in the Act.
141
  
“Title II of GINA prohibits use of genetic information in the em-
ployment context, restricts employers and other entities covered by 
 
 132 154 Cong. Rec. H2956, H2956 (2008) (statement of Representative Louise 
Slaughter).  
 133 Id. at H2957.  
 134 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a)(1) (Supp. II 2008).  
 135 Id. § 2000ff-1(b). 
 136 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2006). 
 137 § 2000ff(7)(A).  
 138 Id. § 2000ff(4)(A).  
 139 Id. § 2000ff(4)(C). 
 140 Regulations under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 75 
Fed. Reg. 68912 (Nov. 9, 2010). 
 141 Id.   
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Title II from requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic informa-
tion, and strictly limits such entities from disclosing genetic informa-
tion.”
142
  The adopted regulations reaffirm that both the use of genet-
ic information to make hiring decisions and the acquisition of 
genetic information are prohibited under GINA.
143
  More important-
ly, the regulations make clear that “[g]enetic tests include . . . DNA 
testing that reveals family relationships, such as paternity.”
144
 
C. The DNA Testing Policy Violates GINA 
Two primary motivations exist for an MLB franchise team to re-
quest a DNA test from a prospective player.  The first purpose is to 
prevent age fraud.  The second purpose is to determine whether a 
player is susceptible to disease or injury.  Whether or not MLB and 
franchise teams are acting with this second purpose is mere specula-
tion; however, it is the fear of this motivation and its implications that 
both commentators and GINA address.  Nonetheless, liability proba-
bly arises even without this purpose because merely requesting a ge-
netic test, regardless of its purpose, violates the Act.  I address the 
motivations separately to illustrate this point. 
First, although the statute states “‘genetic information’ shall not 
include information about the . . . age of any individual,”
145
 and MLB 
seeks only the age of the player, the DNA testing policy would none-
theless fall within the confines of GINA because MLB is requesting 
genetic information from players to determine age.
146
  The definition 
of “genetic information” is likely designed to prevent a situation in 
which an employer requests an employee’s age and is then accused of 
impermissibly soliciting genetic information.
147
  Here, however, MLB 
requests a DNA test.  There is a material difference between the use 
of age and the use of genetic testing to determine age. 
Violations of GINA occur if an employer fails to hire an em-
ployee or discriminates against an employee because of genetic in-
 
 142 Id.  
 143 29 C.F.R. §§ 1653.4(b), 1635.8(a) (2011).  
 144 Id. § 1635.3(f)(2)(viii).   
 145 Id.  
 146 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(4)(C) (Supp. II 2008). 
 147 E.g., Dan Vorhaus, MLB’s Genetic Testing Program at the Plate Again, GENOMICS 
LAW REPORT (July 28, 2009), http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/ 
2009/07/28/mlbs-genetic-testing-program-at-the-plate-again/ (suggesting that the 
EEOC could decide “that the exclusion of ‘information about the sex or age of any 
individual’ from the definition of ‘genetic information’ encompasses genetic tests 
designed to ascertain an individual’s age, although that does not appear to me to be 
the intent of the exclusion”). 
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formation.
148
  An MLB team does not violate this provision of GINA.  
It is not refusing to hire employees because of genetic information as 
defined by the Act.  Instead, it is refusing to hire on the basis of age 
fraud.  The team’s decision is therefore made on the basis of age, not 
genetic information.  This would seem to comport with the legislative 
purpose of the Act.  That is, MLB is not discriminating against pros-
pective players on the basis of information contained within a player’s 
genes revealing a chance of a debilitating disease, condition, or dis-
order.  In short, this practice neither falls squarely within the text of 
the Act nor is it directly associated with the issues the Act is meant to 
address. 
Nonetheless, MLB is still requesting a “genetic test,” defined by 
the Act as being an analysis of human DNA.
149
  Therefore, although 
the purpose of the request is merely to establish paternity and age, the 
request itself likely still violates the Act.  The Act makes such a request 
by an employer for genetic information unlawful.
150
  Thus, the policy 
fits within a literal reading of the text.  The application of GINA to 
this particular situation seems to confirm some fears expressed in the 
House committee report and by Burton J. Fishman and the GINE 
(Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Employment) Coali-
tion.
151
  Although the acquisition of genetic information in this case is 
not inadvertent, it does demonstrate that genetic information can be 
acquired without being used for discriminatory purposes.  Further, if 
the purpose of Title II is to protect individuals from discrimination in 
employment on the basis of genetic information, then the MLB poli-
cy does not violate the “spirit” of the Act even thought it seems to fall 
literally within the statutory language.
152
  Consistent with this concern, 
 
 148 § 2000ff-1(a)(1). 
 149 Id. § 2000ff(7)(A). 
 150 Id. § 2000ff-1(b). 
 151 The House report expressed concern that Title II was overly broad.  H.R. Rep. 
No. 110-28, at 66–67 (2007).  Specifically, the report noted that restrictions on the 
acquisition of genetic information were “sweeping.”  Id. at 66. Burton J. Fishman, 
speaking on behalf of the GINE Coalition, stated that he wished to limit the bill’s 
reach, suggesting “genetic information” should be limited to predictive genetic in-
formation.  Genetic Nondiscrimination: Hearing on H.R. 498 Before the H. Comm. of Energy 
& Commerce, 110th Cong. 2 (2007) (statement of Burton J. Fishman, Of Counsel, 
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Employment Coalition).  He stated, “Pos-
session of genetic information must be differentiated from the use of such informa-
tion for discriminatory purposes.” Id. at 6. 
 152 See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979) (“[A] thing may be 
within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its 
spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.” (citing Holy Trinity Church v. United 
States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892))).  But see id. at 222 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(scolding the majority for ignoring the plain statutory language). 
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some argue that there is ambiguity in the definitions of “genetic in-
formation” and “genetic test” that may make it possible for the EEOC 
to create regulations so as to enforce GINA against MLB.
153
  Current-
ly, as the plain language stands, the mere request for a DNA test—
regardless of the nature of the use of the results—likely violates 
GINA. 
Certainly, if the motivation behind the policy is to determine the 
susceptibility of disease or injury of the prospective players, GINA’s 
application is at its zenith.  Such a request and use appear to be a 
clear and direct violation of the Act.  It is unlawful for an employer to 
fail to hire, discharge, or otherwise discriminate against any employee 
as a result of the employee’s genetic information.
154
  It is also an un-
lawful employment practice for an employer to request genetic in-
formation from an employee or an employee’s family member.
155
  
Therefore, MLB’s policy violates both of the prohibitions set forth in 
Title II of GINA, because the MLB team would be both requesting 
genetic information and using genetic information (such as a player’s 
fifty-percent chance of developing Huntington’s disease) to either 
refuse to honor a playing contract or to fail to renew such contract.
156
  
Furthermore, it is this type of employer misconduct that the statute 
seeks to make unlawful.
157
  The purpose is to prevent discrimination 
on the basis of genetics.  Requesting and testing a DNA sample for 
predisposition to disease and injury and then making hiring decisions 
based on this information is the type of employment practice directly 
repulsive to the statute. 
 
 153 Dan Vorhaus, MLB Meets GINA, GENOMICS LAW REPORT (July 22, 2009), 
http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2009/07/22/mlb-meets-gina/.  
Vorhaus suggests that because genetic tests used to establish paternity may analyze 
only a few genetic markers, such a test might not fit the statutory definition of “ge-
netic test.”  Id.  Capitalizing off of this ambiguity, the EEOC, he suggests, could es-
sentially regulate against or in favor of the MLB when it clarifies what tests constitute 
genetic tests.  Id.  See also Vorhaus, supra note 147, where Vorhaus again suggests 
that the EEOC could exclude from the definition of “genetic test” any test designed 
to ascertain the individual’s age.  
 154 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a)(1) (Supp. II 2008). 
 155 Id. § 2000ff-1(b). 
 156 But see Ilya Gilman, Implications of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 
(GINA) on Professional Sports, ILL. BUS. LAW JOURNAL (Nov. 3, 2009), 
http://www.law.uiuc.edu/bljournal/post/2009/11/03/Implications-of-the-Genetic-
Information-Nondiscrimination-Act-(GINA)-on-Professional-Sports.aspx (suggesting 
that an MLB team could argue that it backed out of a playing contract for a variety of 
legal reasons and that it would be difficult to prove that genetic discrimination was a 
contributing factor). 
 157 § 2000ff(a)(1); Id. § 2000ff(b).  
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A court has yet to interpret GINA or apply it to a specific set of 
facts such as the ones present here.  It is unclear if any defense might 
be available in the MLB scenario.  Might a litigant or court successful-
ly draw parallels between GINA and the ADA or Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act?  For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act provides 
that “it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employ-
er to hire and employ employees . . . on the basis of his religion, sex, 
or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or 
national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably 
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or en-
terprise.”
158
  Health is arguably a bona fide occupational qualification 
necessary to the normal operation of a professional sports team.
159
  
From there, an MLB team might argue that a valid defense lies in the 
request and use of a DNA sample to determine whether a prospective 
player will be able to carry out the necessary duties of his employ-
ment.  Importantly, however, this type of defense, explicitly provided 
in the Civil Rights Act and the ADA, does not appear in GINA, nor 
was it contemplated anywhere in the legislative history.
160
  Some type 
of similar defense arguably should be included and is included in 
some state laws.
161
 
In addition to a contemplated statutory defense, a MLB team 
might argue a defense grounded in contract law.  Although the idea 
of requiring DNA tests for prospective international players raises an 
ethical red flag, teams would argue that they are justified in protect-
ing themselves from age and identity fraud.
162
  An affirmative false 
statement (here, a statement by the player that he is sixteen rather 
than twenty-years old) may be fraudulent misrepresentation for which 
MLB can legally seek rescission of the contract, especially if age is 
considered to be a material fact.
163
  This situation seemingly puts a va-
 
 158 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2006). 
 159 See supra notes 67–77 and accompanying text. 
 160 For the defense provided in Title I of the ADA see 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) 
(2006). 
 161 See discussion infra Part V. 
 162 Hoynes, supra note 12 (quoting Cleveland Indians Director of Scouting as con-
fessing that “[i]t’s a big enough risk for a team just to sign a young player and try to 
make him a professional baseball player.  Now you have to figure out if he is who he 
says he is and if he’s 3 years older than you think he is.”). 
 163 Authorities disagree as to whether an affirmative misrepresentation must be of 
a material fact.  Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162, comment c and 
id. § 164 (allowing claims of misrepresentation without showing of materiality), with 
Hill v. Jones, 725 P.2d 1115 (Ariz. 1986) (requiring materiality); Rozen v. Greenberg, 
886 A.2d 924, 930 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (same); Jablonski v. Rapalje, 788 
STEVENS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2011  9:49 AM 
834 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:813 
lid right to rescind a contract at odds with possible GINA violations.  
Perhaps there would be a defense in contract if a DNA test were the 
only way of protecting against age and identity fraud.  For example, a 
team would face the prospect of age fraud because any request or re-
quirement of DNA would violate GINA; but if a team were to contin-
ue with a DNA test anyway, it might later seek contract rescission due 
to fraud and use this judgment to justify the test.  This argument fails, 
however, because a DNA test is not the only way to determine age.  
Good old-fashioned detective work paired with a bone scan can pro-
duce the same result as a DNA test.  Ultimately, while a contract de-
fense is probably predictable and likely even successful, GINA 
presents a separate issue, and liability under GINA is independent of 
any contract claim. 
V. STATE LAWS ADDRESSING GENETIC DISCRIMINATION 
GINA sets the floor for genetic discrimination statutes and does 
not preempt those state laws with greater protections.
164
  Beginning in 
the 1970s and continuing into the 1980s, state legislators began to 
react to court decisions concerning employment discrimination 
against applicants with sickle-cell anemia.
165
  But the state laws vary in 
content and differ in application.
166
  On one end of the spectrum are 
laws that specifically target discrimination of genetic traits associated 
with a particular race.
167
  For example, sickle-cell anemia is predomi-
nant in African-Americans, whereas Tay-Sach’s disease is prominent 
in certain Jewish populations.
168
  On the other end of the spectrum 
are more comprehensive laws that prohibit any outright genetic dis-
crimination in employment.
169
  As of 2008, thirty-six states provide 
genetic discrimination protection in the employment context.
170
  Any 
 
N.Y.S.2d 158, 162 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (same); Kaloti Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales 
Co., 699 N.W.2d 205 (Wis. 2005) (same).  
 164 “Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit the rights or protections of 
an individual under any other Federal or State statute that provides equal or greater 
protection to an individual than the rights or protections provided for under this 
chapter.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-8(a)(1) (Supp. II 2008). 
 165 NAT’L. CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, GENETIC EMPLOYMENT LAWS (2008), 
http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/Health/GeneticEmploymentLaws/tabid/1428
0/Default.aspx [hereinafter Genetic Employment Laws].  
 166 Trumble, supra note 70, at 779. 
 167 Id. 
 168 JUDY MONROE PETERSON, SICKLE CELL ANEMIA 6 (2008); ROBERT J. DESNICK AND 
MICHAEL M. KABACK, TAY-SACHS DISEASE 233 (2001).  
 169 Paul Steven Miller, Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
189, 193 (1998). 
 170 GENETIC EMPLOYMENT LAWS, supra note 165. 
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genetic discrimination in states without such laws or with laws offer-
ing less protection than GINA will be subject to review under GINA.  
This includes Ohio, where the Cleveland Indians and Cincinnati 
Reds are located.
171
  Because MLB teams across the country may con-
duct DNA tests on recruits, the differences in applicable state law 
could become very significant. 
New York’s genetic-discrimination law, § 296(19) of New York’s 
Executive Law, provides that it is unlawful for an employer to “direct-
ly or indirectly solicit, require, or administer a genetic test to a per-
son, or solicit or require information from which a predisposing ge-
netic characteristic can be inferred” from an employee or applicant.
172
  
But the law allows an employer to require a genetic test where the 
genetic information is directly related to the occupational environ-
ment and in which the employee, as a result, could be at danger.
173
  
The law also allows genetic testing where consent is given.
174
 
The limited exception allowing genetic testing where the em-
ployee’s health could be at risk as a result of the job is of particular 
importance.  This “is a likely loophole to the protections of section 
296 . . . that allows for the submission of employees to genetic testing 
provided that a link is demonstrated between an employee’s sus-
pected genetic anomaly and the dangers of a particular occupational 
environment.”
175
  Paul Trumble argues that had the New York Knicks 
subjected Eddy Curry to genetic testing as a condition of employ-
ment, the team would have been able to argue that testing for hyper-
trophic cardiomyopathy is related to his occupational environment, 
and that this genetic condition would put him at an increased risk of 
death as a result of practicing and playing professional basketball.
176
  
The New York Yankees, a team that has recently been a victim of age 
fraud, might also be able to take advantage of this loophole, using a 
similar rationale, if it decides again to request DNA tests.  The salient 
issue is whether GINA preempts the loophole.  GINA offers no simi-
lar lawful practice of requesting DNA where a link can be demon-
strated between a genetic anomaly and an increased risk of disease in 
 
 171 Id. 
 172 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(19)(a) (McKinney 2009). 
 173 Id. § 292(19)(b); see Renee L. Cyr, Note, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Im-
plications for Job Reassignment and the Treatment of Hypersusceptible Employees, 57 BROOK. 
L. REV. 1237, 1264–65 (1992) (discussing OSHA requirements that employees work-
ing around toxic substances be periodically tested to monitor for any effects that the 
toxins might have). 
 174 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(19)(d).   
 175 Trumble, supra note 70, at 783.  
 176 Id. at 784–85. 
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the work environment.
177
  The more stringent protections of GINA 
might preempt the loophole.
178
 
Ultimately, as twelve of the thirty-six states with genetic discrimi-
nation laws also are home to MLB franchise teams, the intersection of 
state genetic discrimination law and GINA is sure to be an issue.  If 
requests to international recruits for DNA samples are litigated, 
courts will probably find themselves analyzing state law and GINA 
side-by-side.  Moreover, teams would undoubtedly advocate, perhaps 
both in court and in Congress, for the adoption of defenses or loo-
pholes like those in the New York genetic discrimination law. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
MLB and several franchise teams have encountered an age and 
identify fraud problem, specifically involving recruits from the Domi-
nican Republic.  Because teams pay high salaries with large bonuses 
to young players with significant potential, they go to great lengths to 
protect their financial investments in the players.  In requiring the 
players to prove their ages, teams request DNA tests.  DNA testing is 
particularly useful because it establishes the paternity of the parents 
claimed on the player’s birth certificate, which players often forge in 
order to appear younger than they truly are.  A DNA test is then es-
sentially a paternity test.  Commentators and some scouts, however, 
are concerned that the DNA tests are kept and used to determine 
whether a player has a predisposition to disease or susceptibility to in-
jury.  The league itself has declined to say whether the samples are 
being kept. 
The use of DNA is particularly controversial because it contains a 
wealth of information and its widespread use introduces the potential 
for abuse.  DNA is a molecule found in the nucleus of all cells, but er-
rors in DNA at birth or mutations acquired during life can cause dis-
ease when proteins are not made correctly, are produced excessively, 
or are not made at all.  While age, is not a characteristic that can be 
directly determined by the analysis of DNA, the analysis may shed 
light on predisposition for debilitating diseases.  In the employment 
context, the acquisition and misuse of genetic information has 
sparked fears that an applicant’s genetic profile can be discriminato-
rily used to deny or terminate employment.  Employment in profes-
sional sports, however, arguably requires health and well-being as le-
gitimate job qualifications.  Professional sport employers depend on 
 
 177 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff (Supp. II 2008).  
 178 See supra note 164. 
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the health of a relatively small number of employees for financial 
success. 
There exist several potential legal protections against genetic 
discrimination.  The ADA, although arguably covering genetic dis-
crimination in employment, would probably not offer protection to 
prospective baseball players.  Although the ADA protects individuals 
who are “regarded” as having impairment that substantially limits ma-
jor life activities, courts and Congress have declined to include genet-
ic predispositions in this definition, and thus the ADA would proba-
bly not protect someone regarded as have a genetic predisposition to 
disease.  Further, despite the fact that the ADA places restrictions on 
pre-hiring medical examinations and disability-related inquiries, once 
an offer of employment has been made, the employer may condition 
that offer on a medical exam under certain conditions. 
In contrast, GINA likely makes the MLB DNA testing policy un-
lawful.  It would not matter whether the policy is aimed at preventing 
age fraud or whether the samples are kept and tested for predisposi-
tions to disease.  The Act makes it an unlawful employment practice 
to fail to hire an employee because of genetic information or to re-
quest or require genetic information from an employee.  GINA pro-
vides no applicable defenses in this situation, and it is unlikely that a 
court of law would consider one.  Unlike Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act and the ADA, GINA has no defense that excludes hiring and fir-
ing based on bona fide occupational qualifications.  Also, while at 
first glance it appears that teams could have a defense in contract law 
for fraudulent misrepresentation; this defense is probably dubious 
considering that teams have numerous alternatives to DNA testing to 
protect themselves against fraud. 
State law varies with respect to genetic discrimination.  GINA 
provides a floor for regulation in this area but does not preempt 
states with equal or greater protections.  The New York Genetic Dis-
crimination Act makes it an unlawful employment practice to directly 
request a genetic test or information that would otherwise provide in-
formation about a genetic predisposition.  The statute, however, con-
tains a significant loophole: an employer may require a genetic test 
where a link can be demonstrated between the employee’s suspected 
genetic anomaly and the dangers of the occupational environment.  
But as this loophole makes the New York statute less protective than 
GINA, MLB might be unable to take advantage of it. 
The MLB DNA testing policy certainly appears problematic at 
first glance.  As it turns out, however, the policy is likely to receive le-
gal scrutiny only under GINA.  Furthermore, as the purpose of keep-
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ing and testing DNA samples for susceptibility to disease and injury is 
speculative, a court would be left analyzing only the request for DNA 
used to determine age.  Despite GINA’s exception for age, this prac-
tice does fall within a literal reading of the statute.  MLB and its fran-
chises should proceed carefully and with an eye towards the message 
that the policy presents to the public.  An expensive and controversial 
DNA test is probably not needed, as alternatives such as bone scans 
and detective work can just as efficiently protect against age fraud.  
When investigating players like Damian Arredondo, the MLB could 
avoid the bioethics concerns and potential legal issues by simply hir-
ing a private investigator. 
Americans seem fearful about the misuse of genetic information.  
We cannot escape the truths that lie in our genetic profiles.  This is 
most pertinent for professional athletes who, in part, are successful 
because of the talent that can only come from extraordinary genes.  
Nonetheless, all would rather be judged for who they are, not on 
what some genetic test predicts they might become. 
It did not matter how much I lied on my resume.  My real resume 
was in my cells.  Why should anybody invest all that money to train 
me when there were a thousand other applicants with a far clean-
er profile?
179
 
 
 
 179 GATTACA (Columbia Pictures 1997) (explaining the requirements of a pres-
tigious career, Ethan Hawke’s character “Vincent,” is pessimistic that he qualifies). 
